D uring the past 4 decades, the anticipation that basic neuroscience will fully resolve the challenges of mental disorders has powerfully coloured psychiatry. In this issue, Dr Ian Gold and Dr Joel Paris carefully analyze the nature of this optimistic tie between the 2 disciplines. Dr Gold, 1 making good use of his dual erudition, scrutinizes the issue from the philosophical vantage point. It appears very helpful to look from a different angle at the assumptions so widespread in our field. Dr Gold argues against the prevailing neurobiological reduction in psychiatry, and cautions that our specialty unquestionably needs input from many other disciplines besides fundamental neuroscience.
He feels that the question of replacing psychiatry by cellular neurobiology cannot be answered by metaphysical arguments; it can only be definitely laid to rest by further research. However, he finds sufficient reasons to be skeptical that a marked substitution will ever happen. His skepticism emerges both from the absence of justification for the reduction and from the analyses based in the philosophy of science. Among psychiatrists with a philosophical bent, this stance has been defended by others, from Karl Jaspers to Nassir Ghaemi.
Already in his classic General Psychopathology, Jaspers 2 provided perhaps the most tightly reasoned scrutiny of scientific method for psychiatry. He concluded that a human being, with its uniqueness, can never be fully grasped by a single approach to knowledge. And because every method of discovery has its constraints, complementing methods should be used, to understand better the individual's mind. Further, in psychiatry, we also need to understand the meaning of psychological states.
Recently, Ghaemi 3 eloquently defended a similar position. Thus, given this tradition, Dr Gold is in good company. In his criticism, Dr Gold aims at neurobiological reduction because it has recently prevailed. Had he written 50 years ago, Dr Gold probably would have equally sternly criticized psychoanalytic reduction and orthodoxy.
However, there is one point where my observations deviate from Dr Gold's. While neurobiological reduction has certainly dominated our field publicly in recent decades, in current years, I have met many young colleagues who conceptualize much more broadly and in richer colours. In my recollection, an excessive simplification in psychiatry was more evident a couple of decades ago.
Approaching the subject from the clinical platform, Dr Paris 4 offers different arguments but arrives at a comparable position. In principle, he is not opposed to pinning high hopes of psychiatry on the science of the brain, but points out the frustrating truth that, so far, neurosciences have not delivered on such promises. Dr Paris shows that, while neuroscience has made very important advances in brain research, to date it really has not palpably altered psychiatry, either by leading to new, effective treatments or by sufficiently explaining mental disorders. Neuroimaging, neurochemistry, and neurogenetics have offered intriguing findings associated with disorders but have not yet uncovered any specific, practically applicable mechanisms involved. One test of a theory is also its ability to predict, and so far psychiatric treatments have been born from serendipities. Dr Paris describes well the intrinsic barriers that prevent reducing psychiatry to neuroscience from ever being successful.
However, observing my colleagues over the years, it strikes me that those well versed in neuroscience do have an advantage when making clinical decisions. As everyday practice of psychiatry has many grey zones, with incomplete facts, they appear more confident when justifying their verdicts by their recent neurobiological vernacular, while being unperturbed that it regularly changes. The facts of neuroscience can be used as a shield against the uncertainties. Given the challenges of daily psychiatry and the paucity of incontrovertible facts, our desire to replace comprehensive assessments by a straightforward laboratory test and to discover a quick-fix cure is understandable. However, psychiatrist, beware of wishful dreams.
While reading both In Review papers, it is important to keep the heading Psychiatry and Neuroscience clearly in mind; otherwise the papers could be easily misread. These reviews are not the usual, perpetual debate between medication and psychotherapy; they go to the basics. Psychopharmacology, derived in the 1950s from medicine and pharmacology, has made tremendous contributions to the treatment of major psychiatric disorders, and will continue to flourish. The fact that lithium, a simple ion, is capable of stabilizing severe manic depression has mistakenly been used as a major argument for simplistic models.
Both Dr Gold and Dr Paris allude to an authoritative article by Insel and Quirion, 5 2 leading neuroscientists who, in 2005, published an influential article that stimulated much of the neuroscience-psychiatry debate. They provided striking examples of advances in the borderlands between neuroscience and psychiatry, epitomized perhaps most tellingly in the work of Eric Kandel.
Kandel proceeded from his interest in psychoanalysis and in the importance of memory and learning to a study of neuronal connections, and then to molecular biology of the changes observed in neuronal connections that were associated with memory. Based on his fascinating findings, he hypothesized that psychotherapy is one of the vehicles for the mind changing the brain, a speculation later supported by neuroimaging. His work was central in demonstrating the process of neuroplasticity and, of course, awarded him the Nobel Prize.
Insel and Quirion summarize well other impressive contributions that neuroscience has recently made to the understanding of the brain. They recommend that the first 2 years of psychiatric training should be devoted to neuroscience and foretell that neuroscience will now transform the face of psychiatry, its practices and training. Equipped by recent advances, they express, in an upgraded version, the hopes that biological psychiatry has articulated at previous turns.
Nonetheless, despite repeated predictions, psychiatric treatment has remained thoroughly pragmatic so far.
Most of my research has unfolded on a reductionist platform, and I share the widespread hope that the sciences of the brain will markedly improve the theory and treatment of mental illness. There undeniably exists an unbroken chain from genes, proteins, and cells, through neuronal circuits and connections, to simple and eventually more complex psychiatric manifestations. Nevertheless, complex mental phenomena cannot be reduced to minute molecular states. Most psychiatric illnesses are complex phenomena, and no single approach can sufficiently explain them or the experiences of people who suffer from them.
Understanding of mental illness and its treatment is unlikely to come solely from biology, and the discipline of psychiatry can be understood best from a pluralistic perspective.
This interplay of mind and brain sciences has been addressed by Canadian and American psychiatrists years before (see Lehmann 6 and Eisenberg 7 ). Therefore, why is this issue reemerging now, with a greater urgency? There may be a link with recent developments suggesting a stepped-up questioning of the domineering paradigm. The efficacy of our most common biological treatments is being increasingly challenged. Dissatisfaction with the present is also expressed in an increased interest in the past of psychiatry. In another sign of discontent, during the past decade, the fundamental puzzle of psychiatry-the nature of human consciousness-has been receiving unusual attention at a plethora of multidisciplinary conferences, while carefully avoided by neurobiology. Medical students now show less interest in learning the current psychiatry, and young psychiatrists are often disillusioned with the present practice.
Could we be approaching the end of an era? And what would the new paradigm look like? Of course, that is not possible to guess; however, if Kandel's work, and Paris, Gold, and Ghaemi's analyses illustrate, what may be emerging, then a true, integrated, interactional, pluralistic approach to psychiatric disorders may be coming to life. Perhaps we will simply start asking different questions; questions focused not as much on the biological or psychological or social, but more on their intriguing interactions and the implications of such processes. Investigating interactions-being fully invested on the bedside and the bench simultaneously-is very difficult in practice, but may become crucial. The pluralistic view could provide a way above and beyond the perpetual swings between the dogmatism of neurobiological reductionism and psychoanalytic orthodoxy.
May it also be that the main obstacle to the more palpable contributions of neuroscience to psychiatric practice and theory has been psychiatry itself? To be applied productively to psychiatric problems, would not neuroscience need to turn to relatively homogeneous, properly defined diagnostic categories? Do we not need to put sufficient resources in that direction first? It is difficult to imagine how, without marked improvements in diagnostic classification and clinical research, laboratory findings in the brain-however impressive-could ever be replicable and useful in practice.
